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Eastern enlargement of EU immigration and asylum policies occurs at various 
levels and covers a wide variety of activities. One can distinguish between the 
unilateral and bilateral activities of individual member states, coordinated 
initiatives at the EU intergovernmental level, multilateral processes, and 
measures taken within the official framework of EU enlargement. As a 
consequence, the Central and Eastern European countries’ (CEECs)1 adaptation 
to the EU acquis is promoted by a multitude of heterogeneous actors who 
sometimes follow divergent goals and expectations. The argument developed in 
this paper is that Eastern enlargement of EU asylum and immigration policies is 
characterised by a competition between conflicting ideational frames: on the 
one hand the realist frame of internal security, which emphasises the need to 
tighten up territorial borders and to fight illegal immigration, and on the other 
hand the liberal frame of humanitarianism, which incorporates the liberal and 
human rights based notions of freedom of movement and refugee protection. As 
a result, the applicant CEECs are left with mixed messaged and the need to 
reconcile the requirements of migration control with the respect for 
international human rights and the rule of law.
The term CEECs refers to the ten Central and Eastern European applicant countries, that is 
























































































































































































For almost four decades, the movement of persons from and through Central 
and Eastern Europe to Western Europe was only possible on an exceptional 
basis. The metaphor of the “iron curtain” vividly expresses this repression of 
free movement. Under the Communist regimes, citizens of Central and Eastern 
Europe were prevented from moving, or even travelling, to the West by an 
extensive system of exit controls and the military surveillance of the borders to 
Western Europe. On the other side of the “curtain”, democratic regimes had 
long held a liberal stance on migration, rooted in the belief of a citizen's right to 
choose freely his or her place of residence. Part of this liberal approach was the 
establishment of an international regime for the protection of refugees within 
the framework of the United Nations, designed to provide relief for individuals 
whose basic human rights and fundamental freedoms had been violated in their 
home country. At the domestic level, these provisions were implemented in 
asylum laws and some Western European countries enshrined the right to 
asylum in their national constitutions.
Today, Western immigration regimes have undergone a profound 
transformation. The opening up of the Eastern bloc in 1989 coincided with the 
gradual institutionalisation of restrictive asylum and immigration regulations in 
the European Union. This “about-turn” in Western European migration policies 
can be traced back to the economic recession of the mid-1970s, after which all 
Western European countries revised their approach to economic immigration. In 
the light of rising numbers of asylum seekers and changes in the causes of 
forced migration the world over, this restrictive trend also reached the field of 
asylum policies. Since the mid-1980s, efforts to combat illegal immigration and 
to reduce the number of asylum seekers have increasingly been co-ordinated at 
the European level and are now an integral part of European Union (EU) 
policies.
This paper analyses the extension of the EU asylum and immigration 
policies to Central and Eastern Europe from the early 1990s until today and 
seeks to elucidate the institutional and ideational dynamics behind EU Eastern 
enlargement in this policy field. The central argument is that the CEECs' 
adaptation to EU asylum and immigration policies is shaped by conflicting 
ideational frames: on the one hand the "realist” requirements of border 
enforcement and migration control, promoted mainly in intergovernmental co­
operation. and on the other the “liberal” demand to uphold humanitarian 
standards of refugee protection and respect the rule of law, which is mainly 
stressed by international humanitarian organisations and NGOs. As a 



























































































security with the values of human rights and refugee protection in their efforts 
to join the Union. This task is further complicated through the fact that the 
CEECs do not share the humanitarian tradition of their Western neighbours and 
lack the legal, administrative and operational standards necessary for 
safeguarding international human rights norms and the rule of law. Yet. this 
paper argues that under its current setting, the enlargement process tends to give 
the securitarian frame precedence over the liberal one. This is mainly due to 
three factors:
(1) the fragmented and multi-level nature of the EU acquis in this field 
which is split between limited and mainly restrictionist measures at the 
EU level and the continuity of diverging liberal traditions in the legal and 
administrative systems of the member states;
(2) the dominance of intergovemmentalism in the enlargement process 
and herewith the dominant position of member states’ governments; and
(3) the difficult position of the CEECs themselves which, given their 
geographical situation, fear to be transformed into a “buffer zone” 
warding off undesired immigrants on their way to Western Europe.
This paper proceeds in five steps. After a brief discussion of the theoretical 
background of the analysis in section one, section two summarises the main 
elements of the EU acquis in asylum and immigration matters. The next section 
then turns to the beginnings of West to East co-operation in these policy fields 
and retraces the intergovernmental dynamics behind the extension of Western 
policies. The relationship between realist and liberal frames in the EU 
enlargement process is analysed in section four, before the conclusion ends with 
an interpretation of these processes in the broader context of Eastern 
enlargement.
1. Eastern Enlargement and the Transfer of Policy Frames
The focus on the ideational contents of the EU enlargement process in this 
particular policy field links up with the growing interest in ideas and norms in 
policy analysis and international relations.2 The concept of frames derives from 
sociology and has been first adapted to policy analysis by Rein and Schon 
(1991) and Jachtenfuchs (1993, 1996). Policy frames can be defined as the 
ideational core of a particular policy field which contains the dominant 
interpretation of the underlying social problem and expresses guideposts for 
action. This definition is strongly related to the concept of “policy paradigms”




























































































used in Hall (1989 and 1992) and Weir (1992). the notion of “core beliefs” in 
Sabatier (1993) or Muller’s and Jobert's definition of “référentiels” (1987). In 
short, the common characteristics of these policy ideas are their social and 
intersubjective nature in contrast to cognitive beliefs held by individuals, their 
relative stability and resistance to change, and their specificity to a concrete 
policy field. With regard to European integration, the role of policy frames or 
paradigms has been studied in the field of environmental policies (Jachtenfuchs 
1993, Lenschow/Zito 1998), common agricultural policy (Coleman 1998, 
Skogstad 1998) and refugee policy (Lavenex 1999a).
These studies share the basic understanding that political behaviour and 
policy outcomes are shaped by shared, taken-for-granted ideational frames that 
become institutionalised over time. These frames contain both "factual” 
information about causal relationships and empirical facts and "normative” 
devices with prescriptive value as to the “goodness” and “badness” of political 
action.3 Once established, these policy frames shape actors' perceptions and 
interpretations and influence the course of political action.
In looking at the relationship between policy ideas and policy-making, 
however, it is important to note that “ideas do not float freely” (Risse-Kappen 
1994). and that the emergence and institutionalisation of policy frames is 
usually characterised by the existence of conflicting views and political 
struggles over facts, values, interpretations and consequences. This dependency 
of frames from the advocacy activities of particular groups or organisations 
implies that their implementation in public policies will usually reflect the 
position of the most influential actors. Therefore, the distribution of power 
among the actors involved in framing processes and the procedures guiding 
their access and interaction in the relevant policy arena are crucial in examining 
the development and the effects of policy frames. Framing processes are 
embedded in a broader institutional context which structures the distribution of 
power and capabilities among various individual and collective actors and thus 
impacts on the salience and the success of particular policy frames (Lavenex 
1999a). Nevertheless, once institutionalised in public policies, policy frames 
become independent from the underlying power relations and can continue to 
affect the course of policy making even after the social power relations that 
facilitated their emergence have changed (Coleman 1998: 634).
J These cognitive orders are heuristic devices that help to highlight the different dimensions of 
social knowledge. They are, however, only analytical distinctions that in reality are often 
interrelated and overlapping. The distinction between Tactual’ and ’normative’ knowledge 




























































































In the field of immigration and asylum policy, on can distinguish between 
two ideal typical frames: the “realist” frame of internal security and the “liberal'' 
frame of human rights. The realist frame is rooted in a state-centred, realist 
philosophy. It concentrates on the question of border controls and underlines 
the norm of state sovereignty. In this frame, no distinction is made between 
different cross-border movements: illegal immigrants, asylum seekers and 
refugees are equal in the sense that they are third country nationals whose entry 
into the state’s territory must be controlled. The liberal frame, in contrast, 
follows a humanitarian perspective. It focuses on the individual person and 
underlines the norms of human rights. Accordingly, not the cross-border 
movement as such but the individual and his or her rights are the central 
concern. With regard to refugees, this means that this frame underlines their 
right to receive protection and to have access to equitable asylum procedures.4
The dilemma in studying these framing processes is that in liberal 
democracies, immigration regimes always pursue a middle way between these 
two normative extremes: both these aspects, efficient control and the respect of 
human rights and liberal values, are interdependent. Too much liberalism might 
lead to control deficits and thus undermine state sovereignty and, ultimately, 
internal security; conversely, too much emphasis on control might undermine 
international human rights norms and the liberal principles of freedom of 
movement and refugee protection.
Against this theoretical background, the analysis of EU Eastern 
enlargement in asylum and immigration matters is structured along the 
following questions: Which frame of asylum and immigration policy is 
transported in the process of eastern enlargement? Which actors are involved in 
the extension of EU asylum and immigration policies to Central and Eastern 
Europe, and which is their relative degree of influence? And which 
consequences do these framing processes have for the CEECs’ adaptation to the 
EU immigration regime?* 3
4 Of course, these two frames are only the ideal typical extremes of an imagined continuum 
between the two poles of securttariamsm and humanitarianism. Their function is to make 
abstraction from a complex reality and to offer abstract categones, against which this reality 
can be empirically assessed and compared. On the construction of these ideal types and for a 
more comprehensive analysis of frames in European refugee policies see Lavenex 1999a.
3 The term immigration regime applies to the totality of measures adopted in the fields of 
immigration and asylum policy. For comprehensive accounts on this see Guild/Niessen 1996; 




























































































2. The Evolution of the EU Immigration Regime
Co-operation between the European Union and Central and Eastern Europe in 
asylum and immigration matters was induced by the historical coincidence of 
the opening up of the Eastern bloc with the institutionalisation of a restrictive 
immigration regime in the Union. Since the mid-1980s, EU member states have 
increasingly coordinated their immigration and asylum policies in view of 
relieving domestic asylum procedures and combating illegal immigration. This 
“first generation” (Lobkovicz 1993) of intergovernmental co-operation in the 
1980s yielded the so-far most important agreements in the field of asylum and 
immigration: the Second Schengen Agreement of 1990 and the Dublin 
Convention of the same year (see below). Originally limited to purely 
intergovernmental negotiations outside the Community framework, in 1992 
asylum and immigration were introduced into the Maastricht Treaty on the 
European Union as ' matters of common interest”. Together with the crossing of 
external borders, drugs, and fraud, as well as judicial, customs and police co­
operation, these issues constituted the intergovernmental third pillar of the 
European Union on justice and home affairs. This introduction of co-operation 
in asylum and immigration matters into the EU framework was motivated by 
two developments. On the one hand, it was a reaction to the growing political 
weight of these issues in the member states, on the other, it followed the 
realisation that in order to function effectively, the Schengen and Dublin 
Conventions required more substantive harmonisation of national asylum 
regulations. In particular, they presupposed the approximation of the material 
criteria for granting refugee status and the equivalence of status determination 
procedures.
Major reforms of this institutional framework were introduced in the 
Treaty of Amsterdam concluded in June 1997. These reforms were motivated on 
the one hand by the dissatisfaction with the institutional rules of the third pillar, 
which were seen as increasing the democratic deficit and intransparency of EU 
decision making processes. On the other hand, the reforms were meant to give 
new impetus to co-operation in asylum and immigration matters which had 
largely stagnated under the Maastricht Treaty (Bank 1998. Hix/Niessen 1996). 
Beyond these internal dissatisfactions, a third motivation behind the deepening 
of co-operation structures in this policy field was the prospect of Eastern 
enlargement and the need to strengthen the legal basis for the extension of the 
EU acquis to the applicant countries.
The main reforms were the following. Firstly, the hitherto purely 
intergovernmental Schengen Agreement was incorporated in the Union's 




























































































the third to the first pillar of the Union.6 After a transitional period of five years 
after the entry into force of the Treaty (1st May 1999). the Commission will 
have the sole right of initiative in these matters and the Council will decide 
about the introduction of majority voting and about the competences to be 
attributed to the Parliament. Furthermore, flexibility clauses were introduced for 
the UK. Ireland and Denmark which have opted out from co-operation in this 
policy field.7 8The most important amendment might consist in the introduction 
of a competence of the European Court of Justice in asylum matters which will 
\  allow the examination of the conformity of EU-policies with international law
\ I n  terms of substance, common European asylum and immigration 
policiesshave concentrated so-far on the question of access to the territory and 
to asylum procedures. In parallel with the strengthening of the common external 
borders, the^e efforts have mainly consisted in the harmonisation of visa 
policies and thbyadoption of common list of third countries whose nationals 
require visas for the EU; the imposition of sanctions on carriers who enable the 
illegal entry of thira country nationals; the allocation of responsibility for the 
expulsion of illegal immigrants and for the examination of asylum claims; and 
the harmonisation of simplified procedures for manifestly unfounded asylum 
claims. In contrast to these'more restrictive measures aimed a the limitation of 
illegal entries and the fighn. against fraudulent asylum claims, substantive 
harmonisation of asylum and immigration policies has stagnated. A non-binding 
Council resolution on "minimum guarantees” to be accorded to asylum seekers 
during the status determination procedure was adopted in 1995.9 This, however, 
reflects the lowest common denominator and do not lead to an approximation of
6 Visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to free movement have been included 
under the Title IV in the EC Treaty.
' These provisions signify the continuity of certain intergovernmental structures in the first 
pillar and manifest the reluctance of the member states to transfer sovereignty in these 
matters.
8 However, three significant reserves were introduced to the ECJ’s activity in this area. Firstly, 
the traditional procedure for preliminary rulings under Article 234 EC (old Art. 177 EC) is 
modified in such a way that only national courts, whose judgement will not be open to further 
challenges in the respective legal systems, may request such a ruling. Secondly, the ECJ will 
not have jurisdiction over internal border control when “relating to the maintenance of law 
and order and the safeguarding of internal security” (Art. 68 II EC). This formulation exceeds 
other ordre public' clauses in the Treaty and may, if interpreted in an extensive manner, pose 
significant limits on the ECJ's activity in this area. The third limitation is contained in Article 
68 III EC. which excludes the retroactive impact of ECJ rulings on (previous) rulings by 
national courts. This limit is again an important abrogation from traditional principles of EC 
law. Finally, the Court will have no jurisdiction over the non-binding resolutions and 
conclusions adopted under the third pillar unless they are translated into binding directives.




























































































asylum procedures in the member states (Boeles/Terlouw 1997; Guild/Niessen 
1996). Similarly, the non-binding common position on the interpretation of the 
term of a refugee, 10 adopted after six years of difficult negotiations, does not 
lead to an approximation of national recognition practices (Carlier et al. 1997). 
Finally, no common approach has been developed with regard to the temporary 
protection of war and civil war refugees. As recent refugee crises in Bosnia and 
the Kosovo have shown, the majority of member states have persistently 
opposed the idea of “burden”-sharing in Europe and their admission practices 
still follow very disparate policies (Van Selm-Thorbum 1998 and Van Seim 
forthcoming).
To sum up. the conclusion can be drawn that, so-far, European 
intergovernmental co-operation under the third pillar has mainly been an 
instrument for member states governments to increase their means of countering 
undesired migration flows. Beyond this co-ordination of access and border 
control policies, however, national immigration and refugee policies still follow 
very much specific national legal, humanitarian, economic, and foreign policy 
traditions.11 This state of affairs can be described as a “multi-level” acquis, in 
which the European and the national level interact in terms of formal 
competences and material substance: the measures adopted at the EU level are 
only single instruments which pursue mainly realist orientations, while the 
general administrative and judicial authority as well as the basic humanitarian 
norms guiding the exercise of asylum and immigration policy remain in the in 
the domain of the member states or international law.
These characteristics of EU asylum and immigration policies pose two 
challenges to the CEECs' accession. Firstly, in the light of the new competences 
attributed to the Commission and the ECJ in the Treaty of Amsterdam, one may 
expect that the hitherto fragmented and incomplete EU acquis in these fields 
will experience a dynamic evolution, which complicates the task for the CEECs 
to keep pace with the developments within the EU in their preparation for 
membership. The second challenge, however, derives from the limited nature of 
the EU-level acquis and its concentration on “realist”, restrictive elements 
imposing limitations to the “liberal” post-World War II tradition in the member 
states. Considering that the CEECs, under communism, did not share the liberal 
tradition of the West, the implementation of these restrictive measures 
presupposes the establishment of basic legal, judicial and administrative
1(1 Joint Position on the harmonised application of the definition of the term “refugee” in 
Article 1 ot the Geneva Convention of 28.7.1951 relating to the status of refugees, adopted on 
4.3.1996.




























































































standards for the safeguarding of international human rights norms. In turn, the 
perseverance of very different systems in the member states expresses the 
difficulty to determine which substantive models of asylum and immigration 
policies, laws and practices the CEECs should follow.
3. Intergovernmental Dynamics in the Propagation of EU Asylum and 
Immigration Policies
Long before official talks about EU enlargement in justice and home affairs 
took place, the extension of Western asylum and immigration policies was 
propagated at a purely intergovernmental level through the unilateral measures 
of individual member states, multilateral consultations and the activities of 
international humanitarian organisations and NGOs. In the context of the 
abolition of internal border controls in the single market, the liberalisation of 
the CEECs was perceived by Western European governments as leading to 
large scale immigration and challenging the evolving co-operation under the 
third pillar. Not only did the West fear mass movements by the citizens of the 
former communist countries, but it also feared that this region would develop 
into a major transit zone for immigrants and refugees coming from the poorer 
parts of the world. The EU member states therefore adopted a preventive 
strategy focusing on the incorporation of the CEECs into the evolving co­
operation in asylum and immigration matters, including the allocation of 
responsibility for the handling of asylum seekers and illegal immigrants and the 
export of high standards of border control technology. The establishment of 
equitable systems of refugee protection has gained less attention and has mainly 
been put forward by international organisations and NGOs. These processes are 
summarised in the following subsections.
3.1 The Allocation of Responsibility
With the prospect of an abolition of internal borders controls in the EU, the 
major refugee receiving countries in the EU have pushed for the establishment 
of a system of responsibility allocation for the handling of illegal immigrants 
and asylum seekers in the Union. The underlying idea was to compel the 
traditional transit countries of Southern Europe to tighten up their external 
borders in order to avoid losing control over the entry and stay of third country 




























































































The Schengen and Dublin Conventions
The Schengen12 and the Dublin Conventions13 are the first results of this co­
operation amongst the EU member states. With regard to asylum seekers, the 
central provision is the establishment of a system of redistribution for the 
handling of asylum claims based on the “first host country” principle. This 
principle assigns the responsibility for the examination of an asylum application 
to the contracting state which first enables the entry of the asylum seeker. 
Consequently, the result of the status determination procedure of the 
responsible state must be recognised by the contracting parties. The basis for 
this system of redistribution is the assumption of the existence of compatible 
standards of refugee protection among the participating states. Similarly, the 
Schengen Agreement regulated the responsibility of the “first host country” for 
the handling and expulsion of illegal immigrants. The intention to ward of 
undesired immigrants was further supported by the introduction of restrictive 
entry conditions, the tightening up of visa requirements, the imposition of 
sanctions on carriers enabling the entry of unauthorised migrants and finally the 
general strengthening of external border controls.14
Although originally limited to EU countries, the interest of some member 
states in extending the system of redistribution for the handling of asylum 
claims established by these conventions to other countries soon became 
evident.15 In particular, both agreements contain a provision according to which
The term "Schengen Convention” includes both the First Schengen Agreement on the 
Gradual Abolition of Checks at the Common Borders of 14.7.1985 and the Second Schengen 
Agreement of 19.6.1990 applying Schengen 1. Although originally concluded only amongst 
five member states (Germany, France, and the Benelux), all member states with the 
exceptions of the United Kingdom and Ireland have joined the Convention. It came into force 
on 26.3.1995. With the Treaty of Amsterdam of June 1997, the Schengen Agreement has been 
incorporated into the Treaty on the European Union. Flexibility clauses have been introduced 
for the UK, Ireland and Denmark.
Dublin Convention on the State Responsible for the Examination of an asylum claim of 
15.6.1990. The Convention finally entered into force on 1 September 1997 and replaces the 
parallel asylum provisions of the Schengen Agreement.
14 These provisions are included in the Schengen Agreement and have now been introduced 
into the Community framework with the Amsterdam Treaty. Corresponding provisions were 
included in the draft external borders convention of designed for the Union as a whole, which, 
however, has not yet entered into force because of disputes between the UK and Spain over 
the status of Gibraltar.
13 Given its membership in the Nordic Union, Denmark had an immediate interest in the 
adhesion of the Nordic non-EU states to the Dublin convention. Since full membership was 
restncted to EU members, a parallel convention was drafted for the participation of Norway, 
Sweden and Switzerland. With the delay in the coming into force of the Dublin Convention, 




























































































the participating countries retain the right to return asylum seekers to other third 
countries in accordance with their national legislation.
The Designation of Central and Eastern European Countries as “Safe"
This possibility of extending the system of redistribution based on the “first host 
country” principle to countries outside the Union was formalised with the 
adoption of a legally non-binding but politically very influential resolution on a 
harmonised approach to questions concerning safe third countries adopted 
under the third pillar of the Maastricht Treaty on 30.11/1.12.1992 in London.11 
This rule precedes the substantive examination of an asylum application and 
thus allows the direct rejection of an asylum seeker at the border when it is 
deemed that the person had an opportunity to apply for asylum in the third 
country.
The harmonisation of the safe third country rule at the European level 
was accompanied by its increasing implementation in the legislation of the 
member states.16 7 In principle, this rule takes up the redistributive logic of the 
Schengen and the Dublin Conventions which provides that an asylum claim 
shall be examined by the first country with which the applicant has had contact 
and extends it to all potentially safe countries. However, its application towards 
the CEECs departs in one central point from the EU system: it is no longer 
based on the assumption of compatible standards of refugee protection among 
the participating states. The criteria for the determination of a country as safe 
are that the asylum seeker must not fear for his or her life within the meaning of 
Article 33 Geneva Refugee Convention; is not exposed to torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment; and is afforded effective protection against refoulement 
within the meaning of the Geneva Refugee Convention.
In contrast to the Schengen and Dublin Conventions, the introduction of 
this rule and herewith the incorporation of Central Eastern European countries 
into the system of redistribution for the handling of asylum claims was a
In the Schengen group, conversely, co-operation agreements were reached with Iceland and 
Norway. However, this form of co-operation shall be limited to the EFTA countries.
16 Together with the London Resolution on manifestly unfounded asylum claims and the 
London Conclusions on countries in which there is generally no serious risk of persecution 
adopted on the same occasion, these measures represent the first results of a second generation 
of co-operation in asylum and immigration matters under the third pillar of the Maastricht 
Treaty on justice and home affairs. Their legal nature is non-binding and informal since the 
treaty provides only for the adoption of international conventions, joint actions or joint 
positions but not for resolutions or conclusions.
17 For an overview of the implementation of the safe third country rule in the EU member 




























































































unilateral measure of the EU countries - the third countries concerned did not 
participate in the elaboration of this regime and were not asked for their 
consent. Given that international law provides an obligation on states only to 
take back their own citizens, the implementation of the safe third country rule 
and herewith the return of third country nationals required the conclusion of 
readmission agreements with the third countries concerned.
The Conclusion of Readmission Agreements
Originally, readmission agreements aimed at the facilitated expulsion of illegal 
immigrants and rejected asylum seekers after examination of their claims. Such 
agreements can either be limited to the readmission of the nationals of the 
contracting parties.18 or they can apply also to third country nationals. Today, 
these agreements are increasingly being used as a legal basis for the return of 
asylum seekers before status determination on grounds of the safe third country 
rule. They constitute an additional element in the extension of the system of 
redistribution for the handling of asylum claims which is at the core of the 
emergent European immigration regime.19 The crucial difference between the 
Schengen and Dublin Conventions and the readmission agreements signed with 
“safe third countries” is that the latter do not contain any obligation of the 
readmitting country to examine the asylum seeker's request and thus do not 
consider the specific situation of asylum seekers deriving from human rights 
obligations. Furthermore, they are no longer based on the assumption of 
equitable standards of refugee law. This poses the question of their conformity 
with international law, especially with the norm of non-refoulement of article 
33 Geneva Convention and article 3 ECHR which prohibits the return of 
refugees to countries where their life or freedom is threatened.20 This problem 
has also been raised by the German Constitutional Court ruling on the safe third 
country rule, in which it warned that the application of this rule should not lead 
to chain-deportations, in which asylum seekers are deported further by the third 
to fourth and fifth countries where their are no longer safe from refoulement.21
Readmission agreements concerning the contracting parties’ own state nationals are an 
implementation measure for the 1992 London Conclusions on countries in which there is 
generally no serious nsk of persecutionrsee footnote 16.
19 On these contemporary readmission agreements see Schieffer 1997; and Intergovernmental 
Consultations on Asylum and Migration Policy in Europe, North America, and Australia 
1994
This lack of humanitarian provisions has been heavily criticised by the European Parliament 
(1995); the UNHCR (1994) and (1995); and NGOs, e.g. ECRE and Amnesty International 
(1995).




























































































The lead in this extension of the European refugee regime was taken by 
the Schengen states in 1991 with the conclusion of a first model readmission 
agreement with Poland.22 23This agreement, which applies does not only to 
citizens of the contracting parties, but also to nationals of third states including 
asylum seekers who passed through the Polish territory, corresponds widely 
with the redistributive mechanism of the Schengen and the Dublin 
Conventions.22 It has been used as a model for later bilateral readmission 
agreements between single member states and third countries, and it also 
provided the basis for a harmonised approach in the “Draft Council 
Recommendation concerning a specimen bilateral readmission agreement 
between a Member State of the European Union and a Third Country” adopted 
on German initiative in the Council of justice and home affairs Ministers on 
30.11/1.12.1994.
Usually, the conclusion of such an agreement has been linked with the 
adoption of complementary measures for the strengthening of the Eastern 
borders against illegal immigration and financial transfers. In the case of 
Germany, the signature of the readmission agreements with Poland (7.5.1993) 
and the Czech Republic (9.11.1994) were linked to the transfer of DEM 120 
million and DEM 60 million respectively which are intended to “diminish the 
financial burden resulting from the amendments of the German asylum law and 
the readmission agreement(s)” as well as to enhance border protection and set 
up an infrastructure for asylum seekers and refugees.24
3.2. The Sealing of Eastern Borders
The implementation of the “safe third country” rule and the conclusion of 
readmission agreements were accompanied by a wide range of related bilateral 
co-operation processes between single EU member states and CEECs which 
focus on the enforcement of Eastern borders and the setting up of an efficient 
infrastructure for the fight against illegal immigration. This co-operation 
includes the strengthening of national borders through technological innovation, 
the training of police and border guards, the introduction of information and
22 Signed on 29.3.1991.
23 See Czaplinski (1994). These readmission agreements must be distinguished from another 
type of readmission agreement which concerns only the nationals of the contracting parties. 
The latter are specifically applied towards major countries of origin for illegal immigrants and 
asylum seekers and aim at the facilitated expulsion of these persons. Here. Germany has taken 
the lead and has concluded such agreements with Romania (24.9.1994); Bulgaria (9.9.1994); 
Croatia (25.4.1994); Bosnia-Herzegovina. and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(10.10.1996) but also with non-European countries such as Vietnam, Pakistan and Algeria.




























































































communication systems, and changes to criminal law, for example, the effective 
punishment of trafficking in human beings or the falsification or forging of 
documents.
Although there is little clarity over the concrete scope and contents of 
these often informal processes, it appears that they follow clearly geographical 
criteria. Thus, while Germany has focused on Poland and. to a lesser degree, the 
Czech Republic, Austria and Italy concentrate their efforts on Hungary and 
Slovenia, while the Scandinavian countries co-operate almost exclusively on the 
Baltic states. In the framework of German-Polish cooperation, roughly 85% of 
the money allocated in the framework of the bilateral readmission agreement 
(see above) have been invested in the strengthening of Poland’s border control
. . ■ 'icapacities.
The need to co-ordinate these activities has led to the establishment of 
multilateral consultations among the Ministries of the Interior of all countries 
concerned which have materialised in what is known as the Budapest Group. 
This process, which evolved as a continuation of the first big intergovernmental 
Conference on the Movement of Persons from Central and Eastern European 
Countries held in Vienna on 24-25.1.1991, gathers together experts from the 
Interior Ministries of more than 30 countries. The main focus of these 
negotiations is the fight against illegal immigration i.a. through the proliferation 
of high standards of border control, sanctions against traffickers in human 
beings, tight visa policies and police co-operation. With the prospect of EU 
enlargement, most of these activities have been put on the agenda of the Union 
in its pre-accession strategies with the CEECs.
3.3 The Establishment of Asylum Systems
To a lesser degree, bilateral co-operation has also extended to the establishment 
of asylum systems in the CEECs. Co-operation in this field originated in the 
realisation that the effective implementation of the “safe third country” rule, and 
hence the extension of the system of redistribution for handling asylum claims 
to the CEECs, required the existence of a basic legal, administrative and social 
infrastructure. This need resulted from the fragmented and multi-level nature of 
the acquis (see above, section 2) and fact that the CEECs not only lacked the 
common Western European tradition in these matters, but also the norms. *
"5 DEM 54,6 millions were allocated to the Border Guard for the acquisition of 
communication materials, computers, vehicles, helicopters, infrared visors etc. Other 42,8 
millions were given to the police for the consolidation of the technical system securing 




























































































practices and institutions for the protection of refugees which would be required 
for their definition as "safe”.26
Similar to the co-operation in policing matters, this co-operation follows 
very much geographic criteria (EU Commission 1997a). The general focus of 
these programmes is to draft or reform asylum laws and establish an efficient 
administrative structure to process asylum claims, compatible with the EU 
acquis in this field. An important part of this co-operation consists in the 
exchange of information on the countries of origin. This is supported by 
concrete co-operation in the processing of asylum claims both in the 
administrative and judicial procedure and the training of officials. Compared to 
the efforts put in the sealing of Eastern borders, this co-operation has so-far 
received much less attention. Coming back to the German-Polish example, less 
than 1% of the agreed DEM 120 million allocated in the framework of the 
bilateral readmission agreement were given to the Polish Refugee Office, and 
part of it were invested in the strengthening of expulsion capacities (Paquet 
1998: 25).
The extension of the international standards of refugee law has received 
more support in other multilateral processes involving not only states but also 
international organisations and NGOs. Many of these multilateral activities aim 
at remedying the lack of humanitarian traditions as well as legal and 
institutional standards in the CEECs partly as a counter-balance to the 
restrictive policies promoted by EU member states.
Due to its early Eastern enlargement, the Council of Europe and its 
specialised sub-organisations have been increasingly dealing with questions 
related to immigration and refugees. The Committee on Migration, Refugees 
and Demography (CDMG) concentrates on a wide range of migration issues 
such as the integration of legal immigrants, short-term migration programmes 
and the fight against racism and xenophobia. In addition, the Ad Hoc 
Committee of Experts on the Legal Aspects of Refugees (CAHAR) deals with 
asylum seekers and refugee law. Since it consists of EU member states, the 
associated CEECs and other European countries, CAHAR has become an 
important forum for deliberation amongst these different groups.27 A second 
important organisation assisting the CEECs in their transition towards countries 
of immigration is the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). Its focus
26 In legal terms, the requirement of equitable systems of refugee protection in the CEECs for 
the implementation of the ’safe third country’ rule was confirmed by a ruling of the German 
Federal Constitutional Court on 14.5.1996 (2 BvR 1938/93 and 2 BvR 2315/93), see above.




























































































is on technical assistance of CEECs as well as the former Soviet Union 
countries (CIS) in designing, developing and implementing comprehensive 
migration management programmes.28 The Organisation on Security and Co­
operation in Europe (OSCE) has also introduced the issues of refugees and 
immigration into its agenda and focuses mainly on the prevention of involuntary 
migration, protection, and institution building in Central and Eastern Europe. 
The most important international organisation monitoring the CEECs' accession 
to the international refugee regime is the UNHCR, which has opened regional 
liaison offices in all CEECs in order to ensure that the enactment of refugee law 
is consistent with international standards. According to its mandate, this 
organisation makes an important contribution to the adoption of basic 
legislative provisions and the establishment of the administrative and 
organisational infrastructure for the protection of refugees.29 Together with 
IOM and the OSCE, the UNHCR co-ordinates the “CIS Conference” to address 
the problems of refugees, displaced persons, other forms of involuntary 
displacement and returnees in the Commonwealth of Independent States and 
some neighbouring CEECs. These endeavours are supported by several very 
active NGOs.
3.4 Conclusion
To sum up, the export of Western asylum and immigration policies to Central 
and Eastern Europe has started already at a very early stage and is being 
promoted by a variety of unilateral, bilateral and multilateral processes. The 
main actors in these processes are EU member states' governments and in 
particular their interior ministries, which, eager to minimise their exposure to 
migration flows, concentrate from a more “realist” perspective on the fight 
against illegal immigration and the maintenance of internal security. This 
“realist” frame includes the focus on border controls rather than individual 
rights and freedoms; the lack of differentiation between genuine refugees, 
bogus asylum seekers and illegal immigrants: the perception of international 
interdependence as a zero sum game, in which “porous” borders in one country 
immediately has negative effects in all other countries; and the handling of 
asylum and immigration as a problem of internal security.
The transfer of the “liberal” values of Western asylum and immigration 
policies has received much less attention in the intergovernmental framework 
and is mainly being promoted by international organisations and NGOs. Their
In addition, IOM has conducted several studies on the migration potential in Central and 
Eastern Europe and has set up return programs for rejected asylum seekers in several CEECs.




























































































focus of activity is the establishment of asylum systems, the monitoring of 
transnational migration flows and the integration of legally resident aliens. 
From a liberal perspective, these actors concentrate on individual human rights 
and aim to transfer the values of freedom of movement and refugee protection 
which characterised Western post-World War II immigration regimes.
Which course do EU pre-accession strategies towards the CEECs follow, 
considering this complex, and at times contradictory, nature of contemporary 
Western immigration policies? The difficult balance between realism and 
liberalism in the enlargement of EU asylum and immigration policies is 
discussed in the next section.
4 Realism and Liberalism in the Politics of Eastern Enlargement
With the ongoing dynamics of integration, the issues of .asylum and immigration 
have gained a genuinely European dimension: they have been introduced in the 
external relations of the Union and now figure amongst the general 
requirements for an accession to the EU. Adaptation to the acquis reached under 
the political pillars of the Union is no longer a problem of national interests or 
intergovernmental relations, but an indispensable step in the CEECs’ efforts to 
become member states. This section analyses the relationship between realism 
and liberalism in the politics of Eastern enlargement. According to the 
theoretical framework presented in section one, its focus is on the institutional 
organisation of the enlargement process, that is in particular the ideational 
frames transmitted in these processes and the relative influence of governmental 
versus supranational or other international actors. The underlying hypothesis is 
that given the dominant focus on border enforcement and immigration control 
the bilateral processes (see above), intergovernmental structures will favour the 
transfer of more “realist” frames to the detriment of liberal elements. 
Considering the fragmented and dynamic nature of intra-EU co-operation in this 
field (see section two), this section starts with an analysis of the processes 
leading to the determination of the acquis in this field, before turning to the 
dynamics behind its West to East communication and ends with a discussion of 
the evaluation of the CEECs' adaptation.
4.1 The Determination of the “Acquis ”
Notwithstanding the rapidly intensifying intergovernmental co-operation 
between individual member states and CEECs, the introduction of justice and 
home affairs into the EU strategy of pre-accession was only decided in 




























































































Three considerations may account for this relative delay in the 
introduction of asylum and immigration matters into the formal enlargement 
politics: member states’ concern to retain sovereignty over these matters and, 
perhaps more importantly, the obscure legal nature of the agreements taken 
under the third pillar.30 Furthermore, the introduction of these matters into the 
catalogue of conditions for EU membership represented a new dimension in EU 
external relations. In contrast to the earlier “political conditionality” imposed on 
foreign policy instruments like the PHARE-programme and general Co­
operation and Association Agreements that gave equal billing to political 
liberalisation — human rights, democracy, civic freedoms — and to economic 
liberalisation of markets, trade, and investment regimes, the issues of asylum 
and immigration did not refer to the fundamental freedoms of own citizens but 
touched the respective countries' own external relations and their policies 
towards foreigners.
As a consequence, there was for a long time some confusion about the 
scope of the acquis reached in this field and about the measures which the 
CEECs would have to adopt in order to become member states. Indeed, the 
Union's legal acquis in these fields was and still is blurred between binding 
intergovernmental conventions, non-binding resolutions, conclusions, decisions 
and disparate member states' practices with regard to substantive and procedural 
regulations. Even within the European Commission, the exact scope of the third 
pillar acquis was not clear. Whereas some experts insisted that membership 
candidates could not and should not be asked to adopt any agreement that had 
not yet been fully endorsed by all EU member states at the time of accession, 
others maintained that these sensitive issues should be made compelling for the 
CEECs as early as possible.31
An informal determination of the acquis was finally made by the member 
state governments in 1996 with a letter from the Irish Presidency to the CEECs 
which included an extensive list of all instruments adopted by the EU member 
states and the Schengen Group before and after the entry into force of the 
Maastricht Treaty, together with the formally non-binding resolutions and 
conclusions.32 This extensive determination was then formalised by the
30 Contrary to the instruments of “joint actions”, “joint positions”, and “international 
conventions” foreseen in the Treaty, the Ministers have so far operated with “resolutions” and 
"conclusions” which are not legally binding.
See European Dialogue July-August 1996, no. 4: Justice and Home Affairs.
32 Although this letter did not represent a formal determination of the acquis in the field, it 
nevertheless strengthened the legal status of these provisions since it made their domestic 




























































































Commission in its avis 3j (or opinions) on the applicants' progress in meeting 
the Copenhagen conditions in 1997.
In addition to the formal conventions and other legally binding 
instruments adopted by the member states, and informal and non-binding ones 
such as resolutions and conclusions, the avis laid down that the CEECs also 
have to adopt "the agreed elements of draft instruments which are in 
negotiation” (EU Commission 1997b: B.3.7). With the introduction of 
Schengen into the EU Treaty, it was furthermore decided that "for the purposes 
of the negotiations for the admission of new member states into the European 
Union, the Schengen acquis and further measures taken by the institutions 
within its scope shall be regarded as an acquis which must be accepted in full 
by all states candidates for admission”.* 34 This means that contrary to the current 
member states, which were able to negotiate extensive opt-outs to asylum and 
immigration co-operation in the Amsterdam Treaty, future member states will 
have accept the acquis in full. This is supported by the new Article 49 TEU. 
which provides that every European state which wants to become a member of 
the EU must introduce the full acquis in its national laws.
Summing up, member states' governments have succeeded in determining 
the acquis in an extensive way. Considering the hitherto fragmented and mostly 
non-binding nature of this co-operation in the EU, this extensive determination 
was not unproblematic, as the confusion within the Commission shows (see 
above). Indeed, the fact that this determination occurred in parallel to the 
intergovernmental negotiations leading to the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 
indicates that the act of transferring asylum and immigration matters to the first 
pillar and of introducing Schengen into the EU framework were also a means to 
provide a legitimate base to these new obligations of the CEECs. As a 
consequence, this definition of the acquis exceeds the current obligations of the 
member states. This point is supported by the following considerations: firstly, 
the limping implementation of binding agreements in the member states; 
secondly, the exclusion of the possibility to negotiate opt-outs from this 
sensitive field of co-operation; and, finally, the obligation to adopt legally non­
binding instruments plus those measures which are in the process of being 
drafted.
°  The Commission's avis of the ten applicant countries give a synopsis of the applicants’ 
readiness for membership based on an overview of the political and economic situation in 
each country.




























































































The formal inclusion of co-operation in asylum and immigration matters into 
the EU’s pre-accession strategies occurred only relatively late. Meanwhile, 
member states’ governments had already developed a wide range of activities 
geared at the export of Western instruments of immigration control and refugee 
admission (see section three).
In July 1994, this rapidly expanding field of intergovernmental co­
operation led the European Commission to urge the EU Ministers of justice and 
home affairs to take a decision on the procedures for consulting and informing 
the CEECs within a more structured and hence formal relationship in the fields 
of justice and home affairs. It regretted that, with regard to the content of 
intergovernmental co-operation in these fields, the emphasis had been placed on 
subjects related to the fight against organised crime, despite the fact that closer 
co-operation in asylum and immigration matters was urgently needed. It 
suggested that the establishment of adequate procedures and standards would be 
in the interest of all partners and an essential preparation for eventual 
membership in the Union (EU Commission 1994).
Following this suggestion, the Heads of State meeting at the Essen 
European Council in December 1994 decided to formally introduce co­
operation in these matters into the instruments of pre-accession.33 The following 
sub-sections retrace the communication of the EU acquis in the structured 
dialogue, the accession partnerships and the PHARE programme.
4.2.1 The Structured Dialogue
The structured dialogue was established in parallel to the bilateral system of co­
operation in the Europe Agreements as a forum for multilateral consultations on 
various policy fields. Originally, this dialogue was to develop in a series of 
regular meetings between the EU institutions and the associated countries. This, 
however, proved relatively ineffective.
Between the Essen Council and summer 1997, the EU Ministers of justice 
and home affairs only met their Central and Eastern European counterparts 
twice. During that period, the focus of co-operation clearly centred on the 
question of illegal immigration. This is reflected in the list of priorities in the 
field of justice and home affairs set out at the informal Ministerial Conference
4.2 The Communication o f the “ Acquis"
'3 In addition, several initiatives have been launched by the European Commission under Title 
VI of the European Union Treaty on justice and home affairs. For a general account of EU 




























































































on Drugs and Organised Crime held in Berlin in September 1994. According to 
these priorities, co-operation should focus on combating serious forms of crime 
including traffic in human beings and illegal immigration networks (Council of 
the European Union General Secretariat 1994: 6). With regard to the latter, it 
was agreed to improve co-operation in visa policy; effective border controls and 
border surveillance; effective sanctions against sea and air carriers which enable 
the illegal entry of immigrants; the introduction of provisions that penalise the 
illegal smuggling of aliens, and the rapid return of illegal aliens to their 
countries of origin. To this end, several concrete measures were considered such 
as the exchange of liaison officers and experts for the transfer of expertise, 
technology and training. These issues continued to represent the focus of 
activities in the structured dialogue with the Council of justice and home affairs 
in the following two years.
In contrast to these activities aimed at fighting illegal immigration, the 
issues of asylum and (legal) immigration were given priority only in 1997 in the 
structured dialogue with the Council. At the same time, a first informal 
determination of the EU acquis in these fields was made (see above, section 
4.1). The main points of discussion were the “safe third country” rule, the 
possibility of applying the Parallel Dublin Convention and the integration of 
refugees into society. During their meetings with the representatives of the 
Council, several CEECs expressed their concern with being swamped by 
asylum seekers returned by EU countries on grounds of the “safe third country” 
rule. In order to compensate for these eventualities, the CEECs proposed to 
differentiate between front-line countries, directly exposed to refugee flows, 
and centre countries, protected by the “safe third country” notion in the 
emerging pan-European refugee regime. These protected centre countries, 
which, given their relative wealth, would be the favoured destination of many 
migrants and refugees, would be requested to provide the front-line countries, in 
this case the CEECs themselves, with financial support.36 6
6 See also the alternative proposal of a draft skeleton readmission agreement made by the 
Czech Republic in 1995 which stipulates that a multilateral agreement, giving equal 
consideration to the interests of the Central European countries should be aimed for. Stating 
that the current Western praxis of readmission agreements tends to shift the burden of asylum 
seekers to the CEECs, the document expresses the intention to help EU countries, if these are 
in return prepared to assist the CEECs, for example, through the provision of ’financial 
reimbursement for the consequences of illegal migration.’From the Czech point of view, ’this 
can be understood as burden-shanng in the context of illegal migration in Europe.’On top of 
these declarations, the document expresses a clear and fundamental critique of the previous 
unilateral application of the ’safe third country’ rule when it states that its application affects 




























































































4.2.2 The Accession Partnerships • •
By summer 1997, dissatisfaction with the functioning of the structured dialogue 
opened a new phase in EU-CEECs relations based on the new strategy of 
“accession partnerships”. These set up a common structure for all applicants, 
irrespective whether they are already engaged in negotiations, and set priorities 
for adaptation to the EU acquis on a timetable of short and medium-term 
priorities for each applicant. This phase was launched with the publication of 
the Commission's avis (see above) and the proposal for a new “reinforced" pre­
accession strategy in its Agenda 2000.
With the progress of accession negotiations, the first priority in justice 
and home affairs has become the adoption of the Schengen acquis, which 
relates mostly to the strengthening of external borders and the fight against 
illegal immigration. At a meeting with EU Ministers of the Interior in June 
1998, the CEECs agreed to gradually introduce the Schengen acquis even 
before their accession to the EU and put it into practice. At the same meeting, 
the Schengen states stressed that accession to the EU will not take place before 
the CEECs have implemented tight and efficient border control measures.37 In 
order to stress this commitment, the EU and applicant countries signed a “Pre­
accession Pact against Organised Crime” in May 1998 to support the CEECs' 
adoption of the acquis in justice and home affairs and to develop and implement 
joint projects against organised crime, including trafficking in human beings 
and “organised illegal immigration”.38
4.2.3 The PHARE Programme
The extension of the PHARE39 programme to justice and home affairs was 
prepared by the so-called “Langdon Report”40 which set the priorities for co­
operation in these areas and made propositions for the allocation of PHARE 
assistance. The report called firstly for the adoption of measures to combat 
illegal immigration and to enforce border controls, secondly the need to build 
up the institutions and procedures necessary for a working and well informed 
asylum system, and as a third priority the need to combat drug trafficking.
Group of the Budapest Group, Implementation of Readmission Agreements, Report on Theme 
'2: Revised version prepared by the Czech Republic and IGC, Budapest, 15-16 June 1995).
’ Uniting Europe No. 13 of 29 June 1998.
38 Uniting Europe No. 4 of 27 April 1998, No. 10 of 8 June 1998.
PHARE stands for Poland. Hungary Aid for Reconstruction’and was originally designed to 
support economic reforms of the sectors of agriculture, ecology, finance, industry, 
infrastructure, the social sector and education. A similar programme has been established for 
the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union called TACIS.
4" The report was named after its author, Anthony Langdon: an independent expert appointed 




























































































Since then the Commission has engaged in a series of bilateral 
discussions with each associated CEEC to identify the specific needs for which 
PHARE funds might be used. In addition, the programme has moved from a 
demand- to an accession-driven philosophy. While before, the initiative for 
PHARE money had to come from the associated countries, new programmes 
can now be proposed also by EU member states, the European Commission and 
other institutions such as the Council of Europe or UNHCR.
According to the priorities set by the European Commission in the 
accession partnership, PHARE funding for all ten CEECs should concentrate on 
the development of effective border management and (only) in the medium term 
on the establishment of asylum systems and related measures.41 42With regard to 
the latter, the Commission would preferentially support the development of 
adequate institutional frameworks for dealing with refugees and asylum seekers, 
the implementation of asylum procedures, including the training of personnel 
and the development of documentary and information sources. Furthermore, 
PHARE should also support the development of legal advisory systems and 
NGOs dealing with refugees. These activities could be accompanied by 
research, seminars and other exchanges dealing with refugees and specific 
elements of the acquis or other common practical issues (EU Commission 
1997a: 32-33).
A corresponding EU project aimed at strengthening the “capacity of 
Central and East European countries (CEECs) to apply the European Union 
(EU) acquis on asylum and immigration as well as related standards and 
practices” was announced in February 1999 by the Commission and several 
member states.4- In this framework, three million euros have been allocated for 
the period until the end of the year 2000. Compared to the amount of money 
invested in the field of border enforcement and the sum of 16.75 million euros 
set aside this year by the European Commission for projects in EU member 
states, this sum is relatively unimportant.
With the evolution of accession negotiations, the measures related to the 
strengthening of institutional and administrative capacities in order to ensure 
the application of the acquis to the same standards as current member states 
have been gathered under the heading of “Twinning”. These co-operation
41 See the list of priorities in Uniting Europe No. 2 of 13 April 1998; No. 3 of 20 April 1998 
and No. 4 of 27 April 1998. See alsoTEuropean Report No. 2326 of 24 June 1998.
42 These were Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden, see 




























































































processes are guided by member states officials or representatives as "Pre- 
accession advisors” and funded by the PHARE programme."13
4.3 Evaluation of the CEECs' Adaptation to the ‘‘Acquis’’
On the basis of the enlarged membership conditions mentioned in section 4.1, 
the avis given by the Commission in the fields of justice and home affairs cover 
a broad range of issues. As general conditions, they include the accession of the 
CEECs to relevant international treaties, the observation of the rule of law, the 
stability of administrative and judicial institutions, and data protection. With 
regard to specific policy fields, they assess the establishment of equitable 
asylum procedures and laws as well as the adoption of restrictive measures to 
limit immigration and to ensure stringent border controls. As such, they mention 
the tightening up of visa regimes; the strengthening of admission systems; the 
tightening up of enforcement and deportation procedures; the introduction of 
penalties for illegal immigration, and the adoption of sanctions against carriers 
enabling the illegal entry of foreigners; the conclusion of readmission 
agreements with Western and other Central, East, and South European 
countries; and finally the reform of the border management systems improving 
control and surveillance mechanisms.43 4
In sum, the list of issues raised in the avis illustrates the full complexity 
of the CEECs’ adaptation to the EU acquis in asylum and immigration matters; 
it expresses the need to implement both liberal values and institutions, required 
for the respect of the rule of law, international human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, as well as tight control standards, necessary for the safeguarding of 
internal security and immigration control. Thus, the enlargement conditions 
include both levels of the acquis; the common "realist” measures adopted at the 
EU level and, as sort of pre-condition, the observation of basic “liberal” 
safeguards with regard to human rights and the rule of law contained in the 
national political systems.
Unlike the broader framework of enlargement processes, where the 
Commission is competent to evaluate the CEECs' preparations, the screening of 
their progress in justice and home affairs is assessed by a governmental body
43 Twinning’has been allocated 30% of the total PHARE programme per year and focuses on 
the following Tey areas’ of the acquis: agriculture, environment, finance, and justice and 
home affairs.
44 See the Reports on Progress Towards Accession by each of the candidate countries 
published by the European Commission in November 1998 and European Dialogue March- 




























































































composed of governmental representatives of the EU member states. This 
expert group operates under the supervision of a political body, namely the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives of the Member States (COREPER). It 
makes an evaluation on the basis of information provided by the member states 
in their bilateral and multilateral activities with the CEECs, the member states’ 
embassies in these countries as well as European Commission delegations, the 
European Commission through its role in the overall process of accession and 
the PHARE programme, and reports made by the Council of Europe on the 
implementation of the relevant conventions and recommendations. With these 
exceptional proceedings, the member states have once again asserted their 
sovereignty over the policy fields pertaining to justice and home affairs.
From the perspective of the CEECs, this extension of the EU acquis to 
include asylum and immigration matters was not uncontroversial. Central and 
Eastern European countries have criticised the EU’s unilateral approach to the 
determination of the conditions for their membership and have pointed out that 
the EU manifested an unbalanced attitude with regard to the different policy 
fields included under the title “justice and home affairs”. Here, the EU and its 
member states especially pushed issues related to (illegal) immigration, which 
represented highly sensitive matters for the associated countries. In this context, 
these countries expressed their disagreement with the fact that rules which 
affected them particularly, such as the safe third country rule, were negotiated 
unilaterally behind closed doors. The CEECs realise that asylum and 
immigration policies might be instrumentalised by EU member states in order to 
establish a “filter” or a “buffer zone” between them and the countries of 
emigration. Wary of being overburdened with asylum seekers returned by EU 
countries on grounds of the safe third country rule, the CEECs proposed 
differentiating between front countries who are directly exposed to refugee 
flows and centre countries which are protected by the safe third country notion 
in the European refugee regime, and to provide the front countries, in this case 
the CEECs themselves, with financial compensation.45 These controversies 
show the reification of a realist approach in the CEECs' reception of the EU 
asylum and immigration policies, in which migrants and asylum seekers are 
confounded as undesired persons in a zero-sum game of negative redistribution.
While criticising their unilateral incorporation into Western restrictive 
asylum and immigration policies, the CEECs have all engaged in reforms of 
their immigration regimes in order conform with the requirements of the 
European Union. After a first wave in the early 1990s of very general, and
45 This proposal was made at the second meeting of the justice and home affairs Ministers in 




























































































predominantly liberal reforms of their entry provisions and asylum policies 
linked to the implementation of the 1951 Geneva Convention,46 *all associated 
countries have carried through restrictive reforms aiming at the implementation 
of the EU acquis (see CAHAR 1997, European Parliament 1999, Lavenex 
1999b). In accordance with the dominant frame transmitted in 
intergovernmental co-operation and in the EU enlargement strategies, the focus 
of these reforms has been on border enforcement, the tightening up of visa 
policies, the signing of readmission agreements, and measures to fight migrant 
smuggling. With regard to asylum policy, recent reforms include the 
introduction of restrictive instruments such as simplified procedures in 
"manifestly unfounded” asylum requests, the adoption of the notion of ‘‘safe 
countries of origin”, and the implementation of the “safe third country” notion 
towards their own Eastern and south-Eastem neighbours. Similarly, the 
conclusion of readmission agreements with the West usually goes hand in hand 
with the conclusion of such agreements with the CEECs' Eastern and south- 
Eastem neighbours, thus carrying the risk of establishing a chain of readmission 
agreements to countries where the life or freedom of the persons concerned is 
threatened. As a consequence, recent evaluations of the CEECs' preparation to 
EU membership point not only at the need to foster even more the fight against 
illegal immigration, but also at deficits in the fields of refugee protection, 
human rights and the rule of law.4'
As spelled out in a recent report by the European Parliament, some 
candidate countries are criticised for the “lack of a legal framework and an 
appropriate infrastructure” for the protection of refugees (EP 1999: 14). It 
happens that asylum seekers are denied entry at border stations and that the 
have no access to refugee status determination procedures (ibid., see also 
CAHAR 1997: EU Commission 1997a: UNHCR 1996). Another point of 
concern is the use of very tight time limits for the submission of asylum 
applications, the use of extensive exclusion clauses impeding access to the 
procedure, the difficult access to legal counselling, translation problems, and 
the difficulty for humanitarian NGOs and the UNHCR to intervene in the 
procedure (EP 1999: 15, 34, 55). Another point of concern is the treatment of 
undocumented migrants and asylum seekers at the border and their frequent 
detention in so-called transit zones pending deportation. These often prolonged
’ See Pehe (1994), Stainsby (1990), Engelbrekt (1994), and Shafir (1994).
A1 See e.g. the study by the European Parliament (1999), the Reports of the European 
Commission on Progress Towards Accession by each of the candidate countries released in 
November 1998 and the result of the screening in justice and home affairs conducted in March 
1999 with those countries, with which accession negotiations have started and June 1999 for 




























































































detentions risk to be in breach of article 3 ECHR and often lack basic 
humanitarian standards.48 In addition - and not surprisingly so, if one considers 
the difficult economic situation in most of the CEECs - important deficits exist 
also in the social reception capacities for these persons, e.g. with regard to food, 
shelter, and medical care (ibid.: 21). Finally, a more political challenge results 
from the self-proliferating dynamics of the redistributive notion of “safe third 
countries” and readmission agreements and their application by the CEECs 
towards their own Eastern neighbours such as Belarus or the Ukraine (EP 1999: 
44). By this, a system of “burden shifting” risks to be established which pushes 
the function of immigration control and refugee protection further and further 
away from the EU's territorial borders, thus transforming Central and Eastern 
European Countries into “gatekeepers” for undesired aliens and challenging 
fundamental international norms such as that of non-refoulement.
5 Conclusion: Challenges to Eastern Enlargement
The analysis of West to East propagation of EU asylum and immigration 
policies shows that under the current institutional setting, the politics of EU 
enlargement tend to prioritise “realist” over “liberal” considerations. The 
extension of the EU acquis gives priority to the enforcement of Eastern borders 
and the fight against illegal immigration, the questions of legal migration and 
refugee protection, in contrast, have been given much less attention.
Three explanatory factors were identified behind these findings: the 
nature of the EU acquis, the dominance of intergovemmentalism and the 
situation in the CEECs themselves. The acquis adopted at the European level 
so-far is limited and concentrates from a “realist” perspective on border 
controls, the combat of illegal immigration and asylum abuse. As spelled out in 
the condition for membership, however, accession presupposes also the CEECs' 
adaptation to basic legal and institutional standards safeguarding the rule of law 
and the protection of human rights. These pre-conditions are however domestic 
institutions which look back on long and diverse national histories, neither have 
they been unified in the sense of European policies (such as e.g. substantive 
standards of refugee law), nor do the EU institutions have executive or 
legislative competences in these matters. This is complicated by the fact that in 
most current member states, this liberal tradition is no longer consensual and
48 Violation of article 3 ECHR through prolonged detention has been stated by the European 




























































































that most Western governments have and still are limiting their original legal 
and procedural standards.
Against the background of this restrictive trend, the organisational set up 
of the pre-accession strategies with the dominant position of the member state 
representatives contributes further to the dominance of “realist” policies. This is 
complicated by the limited nature of the policies adopted at the EU level (see 
above), which puts additional constraints to the competence of the European 
Commission or the European Parliament in this area.
Finally, the “realist” orientation tends to be perpetuated by the CEECs 
themselves, which, given their geographical situation, fear to be transformed 
into a “buffer zone” warding off undesired immigrants from the wealthier 
countries of Western Europe.
This dominance of “realisnt” over “liberalism” in the export of EU 
asylum and immigration policies poses s'everal challenges to the prospect of 
Eastern enlargement. Apart from the difficulty to reconcile the tightening up of 
asylum and immigration matters with legal and procedural safeguards against 
human rights violations, these processes conflict with the idea of free movement 
of persons which is an integral part of the single market programme. This 
tension has a long tradition since co-operation in justice and home affairs began 
as a counter-reaction to the confirmation of the aim to abolish internal border 
controls (see above, section two). For the CEE region as a whole, this challenge 
to the free movement of persons is aggravated by the prospect of an 
enlargement in stages. The emphasis on external borders and strict immigration 
policies might lead to tensions in the relations between the CEECs and threaten 
historical, economic and cultural ties in the region. The introduction of 
restrictive visa policies proves problematic in these newly liberalised states 
which for half a century have suffered from restrictions to the right to travel. 
The sealing of the Eastern borders also hampers the development of regional 
economic co-operation in the region, such as for example trade relations 
between Poland and the Ukraine. Furthermore, the fact the citizens of some 
associated countries like Bulgaria and Romania need visas to enter the Union, 
while others do not is a major point of controversy in their relations with the 
Union. Among the CEECs, finally, a major problem posed by the emphasis on 
external borders in an enlargement in stages concerns the presence of vast 
ethnic minorities spread over a number of neighbouring countries like, for 
example, the Hungarians in Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Serbia and the 
Ukraine. To conclude, these findings illustrate the challenges involved in 
moving the Union’s borders eastwards, and symbolise the difficult relationship 
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